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RECENT CASES
DEFAMATION BY RADIO-DISTINCT TORT-EXTEMPOLANEOUS REMARK-

The defendant broadcasting company rented
its facilities to a commercial advertising company. During the course of a broadcast by the latter company over these facilities its employee made a defamatory
statement. This statement was not included in the script submitted to the defendant company before the broadcast, but was interjected by the employee. Held,
The defendant company is not liable. Summit Hotel Company v. National
, (1939).
Ati.
,
Pa.
Broadcasting Company,
the courts in which the precise
come
before
The instant case is the first case to
question of a broadcasting company's liability for a defamatory remark interjected
ad lib into a broadcast by a lessee of the company, has been raised. There have
been a few cases involving the liability of a broadcasting company for defamation
by radio. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932); Miles v.
Louise Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933); Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (1934). The decisions in the above
cases imposed absolute liability on the broadcasting company. It was sought to
justify the rule in these cases by drawing an analogy between the position of a
broadcasting company and a newspaper publisher. The rul in most jurisdictions
with respect to the latter has been one imposing absolute liability. Peck v, Tribune
Co., 214 U. S.. 189, 29 S. Ct. 554 (1909); Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner,
250 U. S. 290, 39 S. Ct. 448 (1919).
This analogy has been widly criticized. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts,
(1937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 725; Haley, Law on Radio Programs, (1937) 5 GEORGE
WASHINGTON L. REV. 157, at p. 187; Nash, Application of the Law of Libel and
Slander to Radio Broadcasting, (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 307, at p. 309; SocoLOW, LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING (1939) Vol. 2, page 858.
The criticism seems to be especially apt in considering the facts of the
present case. In the matter of the degree to which defamatory statements could
be anticipated and prevented the present case differs greatly from cases of
defamation by newspaper. There is also little comparison between the two means
of publication in the matter of governmental control and supervision. Considering these circumstances a rule imposing liability on a broadcasting company upon
the same basis as on a newspaper publisher seems to be unreasonably harsh and
unfair. This fact has been recognized in at least one jurisdiction and a rule requiring the exercise of due care on the part of the broadcasting company to prevent
defamation has been adopted by statute. Iowa House, File 302, March 5, 1937.
Analogies between dissemination of matter by radio on the one hand and
dissemination by telephone, telegraph, news-vendors, and booksellers on the other
have been drawn in an effort to adapt the rules of the existing law of defamation
(slander and libel) to the tort of defamation by radio. But in each of these
analogies a close examination has revealed real and important differences. Some
legal commentators have consequently recognized radio broadcasting as being
sui generis, requiring the creation of a new body of rules applicable to it. 2
SOCOLOW, LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING, 868.
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In the instant case the Pennsylvania court has adopted this latter view. Just
what the rules governing the new tort of defamation by radio will be in Pennsylvania, the court does not reveal beyond the statement that with respect to liability
of the broadcasting company a rule should be applied "which will not impose too
heavy a burden on the industry, and yet will secure a high measure of protection
to the public or thos'e who may be injured." A rule imposing liability without
fault is definitely repudiated. Any such rule would indeed seem to be out of
place in Pennsylvania law in view of the fact that the Pennsylvania courts have
definitely allied themselves with the great weight of modern authority that no one
should b'e held liable for an unintentional injury resulting from performance of a
lawful act without negligence or wilful misconduct. Ebbart et al. v. Phila. Electric
Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 At. 323 (1938).
L.G.

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS-WRONGFUL DEATH-SUIT BY WIDOW ON OWN
AND HUSBAND'S CAUSES OF ACTION-OVERLAPPING OF DAMAGES AVOIDED.
Plaintiff's husband died as a result of injuries caused by an accident involving
the defendant's automobile. Husband did not bring suit in his lifetime. Widow
sues to recover for loss caused her by husband's death and also to recover, as
administratrix of husband's estate, on husband's cause of action. Held, that if
no suit is brought by one who dies of injuries sustained through negligence of another, the relatives of decedent may sue the wrongdoer for the loss which the death
caused them and the personal representative may sue upon whatever cause of
action the decedent might have sued in his lifetime: Gannon et al. v. Lawler, 34
Pa.-D. & C. 571 (1939).
The right of a widow to sue for loss caused her by her husband's death as a
result of unlawful violence or negligence was establishedby Act of April 15, 1851.
P. L. 669, sec. 19, 12 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 1601. The act provided that shv
could sue only if the husband had brought no suit in his lifetime. The Act of
April 26, 1855, P. L. 30, as amended by Act of June 7, 1911, P. L. 678, 12
PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 1602, gives the above mentioned rights to the surviving
husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased provided no suit had been
brought by him in his lifetime.
By section 35 (b) of the FIDUCIARIES ACT of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, 20
PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 772, the personal representatives of a decedent were authorized to commence and prosecute all personal actions which the decedent might
have commenced and prosecuted, except actions for slander and for libel. However, this section of the act was declared unconstitutional because the title did not
clearly indicate that a provision for such suits was to be included in the act.
Strain, Adm'r., v. Kern, 277 Pa. 209, 120 Atl. 818 (1923). The act of July 2,
1937, P. L. 2755, 20 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 772, amended the title of the FIDUCIARIES ACT to meet this objection and reenacted section 35 (b).
Thus, if no action is brought by the decedent during his lifetime, there are
now two actions which may be brought against the wrongdoer; one by certain
named relatives of the deceased for loss caused them by death, and the other, by
personal representatives as outlined above. The question has arisen, whether the
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wrongdoer is open to two suits, in the case where death was caused by the injury,
or whether the legislature intended that section 35 (b) should be used only
where the injury did not cause the death, but the decedent died before bringing
suit for damages caused him by the injury. On this point there has been a difference of opinion. (1937) 42 DICK. L. REV. 41; Lutge v. Rosin, 32 Pa. D.
& C. 338 at 347 (1938); Meyer, New Death Act, (1939) 43 DICK. L. REV. 83.
The instant case is the first case recorded in Pennsylvania which is on point. In
deciding that two suits could be brought the court reached the same conclusion that
has been reached in other states under similar statutes. May Coal Co. v. Robinette,
120 Ohio St. 110, 165 N. E. 576 (1929); Hindmarsh v. Supho Saline Bath Co.,
108 Neb. 168, 187 N. W. 806 (1922); St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Roberson,
103 Ark. 361, 146 S. W. 482 (1912); Stewart v. United Elec. Co., 104 Md. 332,
65 Atl. 49 (1906); Spradin v. Georgia R. & E. Co., 139 Ga. 575, 77 S. E. 799
(1913); Meyer, New Death Act, (1939) 43 DICK. L. REv. 98. It seems probable that this decision will establish a precedent to be followed in Pennsylvania.
The court also defined rules to be followed in determining what damages
can be recovered by the relatives and what by the personal representatives. Such
a rule is necessary to prevent double recovery of damages.
C. H. D.

